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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

Counterterrorism and the Intelligence Community: What's Been Done From the NIC Over the Past Year?

FROM:

David D. Whipple
NIO for Counterterrorism
7E47 HQS

EXTENSION

NO.

NIC-06680-84

DATE

28 November 1984

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TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

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COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

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The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

NIC-06680-84
28 November 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Chairman, National Intelligence Council

FROM: David D. Whipple [redacted]
National Intelligence Officer for Counterterrorism

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SUBJECT: Counterterrorism and the Intelligence Community: What's
Been Done From the NIC Over the Past Year? [redacted]

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1. To complete my experience over the past year as the NIO/CT, I thought it would be useful to summarize and review what has been begun or accomplished essentially from the NIC to improve the Community's performance. [redacted]

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2. Attached is my summation. [redacted]

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3. I believe the Community's overall performance now against terrorists and terrorism is significantly better than it was a year ago. For example, our predictions of likely terrorist attacks are sharper and more accurate than they were, although we continue to receive criticism for lack of specifics and details in our alerting predictions. NIC contributions (mostly from the NIO/CT office), both of substance or by exhortation, played a part in bringing about these improvements.

4. Terrorism analysis by most of the Community's agencies is better done than before because, thanks to [redacted] and some of the other innovations, those agencies are now able to work together quickly sharing leads and threat information. The State Department, egged on by its INR, has begun to insist on more and better reporting from open sources from the Department's foreign service officers overseas. This innovation strikes me as a much needed plus,

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and the resultant additional reporting provides a useful data background [redacted] 25X1
[redacted] Collaboration with foreign 25X1
counterpart security and intelligence services abroad is also for the most
part close and increasingly fruitful. [redacted] 25X1

5. I am reasonably encouraged by the Community's progress in 1984, and
look forward to an increase in the pace of improvements in 1985. [redacted] 25X1

David D. Whipple

David D. Whipple [redacted] 25X1

Attachment:
As Stated

cc: VC/NIC

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Year-End Summary of NIC Contributions to Improvements in the
Intelligence Community's Performance Against Terrorism in 1984

As the year began, there was an evident need to sharpen cooperation and coordination among Intelligence Community (IC) agencies engaged in collecting and analyzing intelligence.

- By early February, the various collecting and analyzing agencies in Washington were electronically linked, enabling analysts to quickly and informally communicate with each other from and to their individual work places in secure voice, conferencing, and facsimile modes. Since then, terrorism analysts throughout the Community have made continuous use of this capability night and day to exchange critical information, to rapidly assess it, and to arrive at critical judgments as to its reliability. Much of the fragmentary, questionably sourced information of the past can now either be eliminated or checked out and supplemented with collateral information before it is disseminated as threat alerts or warnings. The same electronic system ensures that no threat report, no matter how incomplete it may be in its original form or by whom it is received, need be overlooked or neglected by analysts in other agencies who may already have or can get confirming or conflicting information to validate or invalidate it. The new system has significantly contributed to the Community's ability to produce more reliable and comprehensive threat alerts and warnings to US facilities and allies abroad and to policymakers in Washington.
- The NIO/CT sponsored a series of analytic conferences and seminars held at various Community agencies to facilitate primary discussion on current terrorist topics of interest. Speakers and participants were from inside and outside the government. Invitees were, for the most part, working analysts from all USG agencies concerned with international and domestic terrorism. In 1984 there were separate seminars/conferences on Iranian/Syrian, Libyan, Latin American, Armenian, Italian, Lebanese, Kurdish, and Western European terrorists and terrorism. This educational cross-fertilization of information and assessments was designed to enhance cohesion within the various agencies working on collection and analysis.

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- A short-term interagency exchange program for analysts, aimed at "cross-pollinating" ideas and experience, has been implemented. A number of working analysts are presently on loan by their parent to other agencies.
- During the year the NIO/CT traveled [redacted] 25X1
[redacted] 25X1
[redacted] to brief and be briefed 25X1
by [redacted] civilian and military intelligence 25X1
services and law enforcement agencies. Objectives of these trips were to promote a continuing exchange of terrorism leads, data and analysis, and to determine how intelligence collected abroad can be improved and presented so as to best serve users. Analysts and other professionals from several US intelligence agencies accompanied the NIO [redacted] to participate in round-table substantive exchanges with [redacted] intelligence/security [redacted] and to Los Angeles to arrange that raw and analytical intelligence and terrorism leads collected abroad would quickly be made available and intelligible to law enforcement officials responsible for security at the Olympics. These were unique and successful experiences in multiagency liaisons with foreign intelligence and security services and with domestic law enforcement officials.
- The NIO/CT frequently briefed representatives of foreign liaison services in Washington, representatives of several US military commands, and others in the Community on terrorism-related issues, developments, and objectives. All presentations and participations were designed to enhance cooperation and coordination among agencies and allies concerned with combatting terrorism. He also responded, or coordinated responses from Community agencies, to a variety of written information requests from Congressional committees. On various occasions, he personally briefed Congressional committee principals and staffers on the Hill on aspects of terrorism abroad and on USG measures to combat it.
- The NIO/CT or the A/NIO/CT took advantage of frequent opportunities to personally lecture on international terrorism, or to participate in panel discussions, in a variety of CIA and NSA training courses and orientations, and DIA- and State Department-sponsored gatherings.

There also was a need to promote a rational, complete, and consistent interagency intelligence effort against terrorism.

- The NIO/CT chaired the Interagency Intelligence Committee on Terrorism (IICT) which is the principal interagency coordinating mechanism for terrorism intelligence planning and guidance. The IICT in turn sponsored special informal subcommittees and temporary working groups to concentrate on specific problems, e.g., a pre-Olympics planning committee headed by the FBI designed to ensure that terrorism leads and supporting data collected abroad were quickly made available to American law enforcement officials on the

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scene in Los Angeles; a working group of representatives from several agencies specializing in explosives used by terrorists and possible countermeasures and in explosive ordnance disposal. The NIO/CT also occasionally participated with the Critical Intelligence Problems Committee (CIPC) Working Group on Terrorism, DCID 1/2 Committee on collection and analysis priorities, and the Los Angeles Olympic Organizing Committee's Overseas Government Relations Section, and in intelligence-related meetings with the State Department-chaired Interdepartmental Group on Terrorism, the NSC-chaired Terrorist Incident Working Group, the White House Operations Group, and the Armed Forces Inaugural Committee.

- An estimate on Prospects for Anti-US Terrorism in the year ahead, which also reviewed and analyzed terrorism threats in the US and elsewhere from mid-1983 to October 1984, was prepared and published under NIO/CT auspices. Representatives of NFIB collection agencies contributed to the detailed substantive and editorial review of the publication draft, making the final product a Community presentation.
- The NIO/CT prepared the first draft input to the DCI response to the National Security Decision Directive (NSDD 138) on combatting terrorism. This input was a compilation of ideas and capabilities for enhancing the Intelligence Community's response to terrorism, drawn from all agencies. This compilation became the basis for the final DCI submission to the policymakers, which was drafted by the Community Staff in consultation with the NIO/CT and coordinated throughout the Community. The final submission summarized and prioritized the enhancements originally suggested by the NIO/CT.
- The NIO/CT assisted CIA's Director of Security in reviewing and arranging to improve a study drafted by State/Security assessing risks to US diplomatic missions overseas from terrorists. The study became the basis for recommendations on prioritizing and implementing enhancements to the physical security and protection of USG installations abroad.
- The NIO/CT and the State Department obtained preliminary agreements within the Community to a new terrorism alert warning system featuring alerts quickly coordinated throughout the Community to be sent to diplomatic posts abroad via one communications channel. The objective is to reduce duplication and confusion resulting from alerts based on single-source reportings which are currently sent abroad via various channels.
- A beginning has been made to develop special courses to train analysts from all USG agencies concerned with terrorism. Information about the four training courses already being offered within the Community will be made known to would-be student candidates, through the IICT mechanism.

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- The NIO/CT acted as a referent for terrorism-related matters to CIA's Public Affairs Office. In addition to his participation as speaker at training courses and seminars inside the Government, the NIO/CT was one of the featured speakers at the annual convention of the Association of Former Intelligence Officers, at an inquiry into terrorism as a threat to US naval assets conducted by the Chief of Naval Operations' Executive Panel Task Force on Terrorism, at a terrorism conference arranged by the State Department's Office of Counterterrorism and Emergency Planning and State/INR for US corporation and "think tank" as well as USG community representatives, and at briefings and orientations for the benefit of security executives of private American corporations.

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